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Civil Forfeiture Hits Home: A Critical Analysis of
United States v. Lot 5, Fox Grove
Alejandro Caffarelli
[IMt makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when
the State stands to benefit.1
In April 1992, the United States filed a forfeiture complaint
against the home of Savanah Wims 2 under the federal civil
drug-related forfeiture statute.3 The government alleged that
her house was being used to facilitate drug transactions.4 Gov-
ernment evidence established probable cause 5 necessary to for-
feit the house.6 Wims responded that the Florida Constitution
exempted her home from forfeiture.7 In United States v. Lot 5,
1. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 978 n.9 (1991).
2. United States v. Lot 5, Fox Grove, 23 F.3d 359, 360 (11th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 722 (1995). Because civil forfeitures are in rem actions,
the government must file the complaint against the "offending property." See
infra note 31 (discussing the in rem nature of civil forfeitures).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988). The pertinent section, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7),
provides:
(a) Subject Property. The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the
United States and no property right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including
any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any
appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used,
in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a
violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's impris-
onment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this para-
graph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
Note the "innocent owner" provision; spouses have used this provision success-
fully to retain their interest in forfeited property. United States v. 2525 Leroy
Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1414 (1991);
United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990).
4. Lot 5, 23 F.3d at 360-61.
5. See infra note 33 (discussing the probable cause standard).
6. Lot 5, 23 F.3d at 360-61.
7. Id. at 361.
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Fox Grove8 ("Lot 5"), the Eleventh Circuit became the first fed-
eral appellate court to decide whether a state constitutional pro-
vision protecting homesteads precludes federal civil drug-
related forfeitures.9 The court ultimately dismissed Wims's ar-
gument, holding that federal forfeiture law preempts state
homestead protection.' °
Several federal claimants"x preceding Wims have used the
homestead defense without success.12 The claimants argued
that state legislatures have traditionally protected homesteads
from forfeiture,' 3 and that this protection extended to their
homes notwithstanding the federal forfeiture law.14 The courts,
however, responded that Congress intentionally destroyed state
homestead protections, because the federal civil drug-related
forfeiture statute constitutes part of a long line of congressional
anti-drug measures designed to increase prosecutorial
strength.15
8. 23 F.3d 359 (11th Cir. 1994).
9. One other appellate court has decided the homestead exemption issue
under a state statute. United States v. Curtis, 965 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1992).
10. Lot 5, 23 F.3d at 363.
11. In forfeiture actions, the court refers to the property owner as a "claim-
ant," not a defendant, because the action is against the property itself. Id. at
360.
12. United States v. 5604 S. Perry Ave., No. 91-C-1006, 1992 WL 44843, at
*1-*2 (N.D. IlM. Feb. 27, 1992) (holding that federal forfeiture preempts state
homestead protection); United States v. 1606 Butterfield Rd., 786 F. Supp.
1497, 1504-05 (N.D. Iowa 1991) (same); United States v. 212 Airport Rd. S., 771
F. Supp. 1214, 1215-16 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (same).
13. State courts commonly protect homesteads from forfeiture under state
forfeiture statutes. See infra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining state
court protection of homesteads from similar state drug-related forfeiture laws).
Federal bankruptcy courts have protected homesteads in bankruptcy cases.
See, e.g., In re Johnson, 880 F.2d 78, 82-83 (8th Cir. 1989) (relying on state law
to determine whether to protect a homestead from forfeiture); In re Hersch, 23
B.R. 42, 44-45 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (same).
Courts have allowed government forfeiture of homesteads under the Racke-
teering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963
(West 1984 & Supp. 1995). United States v. Myers, 21 F.3d 826, 828 (8th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 742 (1995); United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13
F.3d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Martenson, 780 F. Supp. 492,
494-96 (N.D. IlM. 1991). RICO explicitly states, however, that the government
may forfeit property "irrespective of any provision of state law." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1963(a) (West Supp. 1995). The federal drug forfeiture statute does not have
a similar clause.
14. 5604 S. Perry Ave., 1992 WL 44843 at *1; 1606 Butterfield Rd., 786 F.
Supp. at 1503; 212 Airport Rd. S., 771 F. Supp. at 1215.
15. Since the late 1970s, Congress and other branches of the federal gov-
ernment have consistently increased prosecuterial power to fight the war on
drugs. See, e.g., Eric Schlosser, Reefer Madness: Why Is It That Today, When
We Don't Have Enough Jail Cells for Violent Criminals, There May Be More
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This Comment contends that the real property provision of
the federal civil drug related forfeiture statute16 does not com-
pletely destroy state homestead protections. 17 Part I details
traditional preemption jurisprudence and congressional adop-
tion of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Part I
also describes the rationale and history behind state homestead
protection. Part II describes the Eleventh Circuit's holding in
Lot 5. Part I contends that the Lot 5 court failed to apply prop-
erly the preemption doctrine and concludes that states, through
constitutional or statutory means, should determine the extent
of homestead protection. This Comment proposes that federal
courts honor the traditional role that individual states have in
homestead protection by shifting the burdens at trial. Specifi-
cally, when the government files a claim against a state-ex-
empted homestead, it should bear the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to for-
feiture under the federal drug forfeiture statute.
I. FEDERAL SUPREMACY, STATE SOVEREIGNTY, AND
THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL CIVIL DRUG-
RELATED FORFEITURE STATUTE
When Congress enacted the civil drug-related forfeiture
statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881 ("Forfeiture Statute"), as part of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970,18 it gave prosecutors the power to seize drug-related prop-
erty. In 1984, Congress amended the Forfeiture Statute with
People in Prison for Marijuana Offenses Than Ever Before?, S.F. CHRON., Aug.
28, 1994, at 7 (noting the zeal with which Congress has increased prosecutorial
strength); Has the GOP Gone Soft on Crime?, PLAwN DEALER (Cleveland), May
23, 1992, at 4C (same).
Courts have also recognized Congress's strong dislike of the drug trade.
See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 501
(1993) (noting that Congress intended the drug forfeiture statute to be a power-
ful tool against the drug trade); United States v. Accounts Nos. 3034504504 &
144-07143 at Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 971 F.2d 974, 976
(3d Cir. 1992) (noting that Congress intended federal forfeiture under money
laundering statute to increase prosecutorial strength).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). For the statutory text, see supra note 3. For a
discussion of the statute's development and forfeiture in general, see infra part
I.A.
17. See infra part I.C (discussing the nature and scope of state homestead
protection laws).
18. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881).
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the Comprehensive Crime Control Act,19 which, among other
things, included real property among the assets liable under the
statute.20
A. FEDERAL CIVIL DRUG-RELATED FORFErruRE: A NEW
WEAPON FOR THE WAR ON DRUGS
The first civil forfeiture statute came into being more than a
century ago, 21 but only recently did Congress decide to use civil
forfeiture2 2 to combat criminal activity.23 In the mid-1980s,
drug abuse and the violence associated with it became a major
national issue.24 As a result, the government implemented an
aggressive campaign against illegal drug use and trade known
as the "drug war."25 Despite criticism that fighting drug abuse
was a misguided attempt to remedy underlying social
problems,26 the media and the law enforcement community con-
19. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306, 98 Stat. 1976, 2050 (1984) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)). The Act amended 21 U.S.C. § 881, which had been enacted
October 27, 1970, as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act.
20. Congress hoped to curb drug-related crime by striking out at drug deal-
ers and seizing some of their real property assets. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374. Nonetheless,
Congress does not specifically mention the forfeiture of homesteads. Id.
21. Early English forfeiture acts gave the crown the power to forfeit any
ship that violated customs or revenue laws. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. .663, 683 (1974). Shortly after U.S. independence, Con-
gress passed its first civil forfeiture law. Id. at 683 n.21 (citing Act of July 31,
1789, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 39, 47 (making ships and cargo in violation of customs
law subject to federal forfeiture); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, §§ 13, 22, 27, 28, 67, 1
Stat. 157, 161, 163, 176).
22. See infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text (discussing the difference
between civil and criminal forfeitures).
23. 1 STEVEN L. KESSLER, CIVIL AND CRIMNAL FORFEITURE: FEDERAL AND
STATE PRACTICE § 1.01 (1994) ("For those who have been in hibernation for the
past two decades, welcome to the Brave New World of Forfeiture.") Frustrated
by failed government efforts to combat crime, Congress decided to take the
route of forfeiture. Id. Forfeiture offered an attractive and inexpensive alterna-
tive to prison. Id.
24. See generally John E. Merriam, National Media Coverage of Drug Is-
sues, 1983-1987, in CoMMuNICATION CAMPAIGNS ABouT DRUGS: GovERNMENT,
MEDIA, AND THE PUBLIC 21-28 (Pamela Shoemaker ed., 1989) [hereinafter CAM-
PAIGNS ABOUT DRUGS] ("National media coverage of drug issues between 1983
and 1987 followed a classic pattern: [t]here was a slow initial increase in over-
all media attention... [tihen interest in drugs increased sharply, peaked, and
declined.").
25. See generally WAR ON DRUGS: STUDIES IN THE FAILURE OF U.S. NARCOT-
ICS POLICY 1-10 (Alfred W. McCoy & Alan A. Block eds., 1992) (describing the
history and development of the war on drugs).
26. See generally CRISTiNA J. JOHNS, POWER, IDEOLOGY, AND THE WAR ON
DRUGS 1-31 (1992) (arguing that the war on drugs is a misdirected policy with
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tinued to perceive drugs as the root cause of violence and crimi-
nal activity.27 In response to public and political pressure,
Congress looked for a strong weapon with which to fight the
drug war. That weapon was forfeiture. 28
Forfeitures generally fall into two categories: civil and
criminal.29 Criminal forfeitures depend entirely on the trial and
conviction of the property owner.30 Civil forfeitures, however,
are actions against the property, wholly unaffected by the prop-
serious negative social implications); CAMPAIGNS ABOUT DRUGS, supra note 24,
at 1 (describing how the government and media created the war on drugs);
SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES: DRuG-CONTROL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
58, 413-14 (Melvyn B. Krauss & Edward P. Lazear eds., 1991) (arguing that
legalization would actually help drug addicts and that drug abuse may actually
be higher than it would be without prohibition); cf john a. powell & Eileen B.
Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution and
the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 557 (1991) (pointing to the failure
of the war on drugs and its ill effects in the black community).
27. CAmPAIGNS ABoUT DRUGS, supra note 24, at 23.
28. A Senate report best explained the purpose of forfeiture:
Today, few in Congress or the law enforcement community fail to rec-
ognize that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment
are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in
dangerous drugs which, with its inevitable attendant violence, is
plaguing the country. Clearly, if law enforcement efforts to combat
racketeering and drug trafficking are to be successful, they must in-
clude an attack on the economic aspects of these crimes. Forfeiture is
the mechanism through which such an attack may be made.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3182,
3374. Congress also focused on property "indispensable" to the commission of a
crime. Id.
29. 1 KESSLER, supra note 23, § 1.04. The terms "civil" and "criminal" do
not necessarily indicate the nature of the forfeiture. Even though the word
"civil" is placed on some forfeiture statutes, they are in reality "quasi-criminal"
in that they have just as much punitive effect as criminal forfeitures. Id.
The Supreme Court recognized the criminal aspect of civil forfeitures as
early as 1886. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886) ("We are also
clearly of [the] opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring
the forfeiture of a [person's] property by reason of offen~sles commited by [that
person], though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal.").
30. See, e.g., United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d
1210, 1218 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting criminal forfeiture may be ordered only
where defendant is convicted); United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385,
387 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (same); United States v. Ambrosio, 575 F. Supp. 546, 550
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (same). Jurisdiction over the person is "in personam." An "in
personam action" is an "[aiction seeking judgment against a person involving
[that person's] personal rights and based on jurisdication of [the] person, as
distinguished from a judgment against property (i.e. in rem)." BLAcieS LAw
DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990).
In criminal in personam actions, courts provide defendants with a variety
of constitutional protections ranging from the Excessive Fines Clause to the
Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses. United States v. Two A-37 Cessna
Jets, No. 90-CV-0852E, 1994 WL 167998, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 1994) (stat-
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erty owner's guilt or innocence.31 The two types of actions differ
most significantly in the burden of proof that each places on the
property owner. In a criminal forfeiture, the property owner has
no burden; the government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the property and its owner were involved in the ille-
gal activity.3 2 In a civil forfeiture, however, the government
need only establish probable cause33 linking the property to an
ing that excessive fines and double jeopardy protections "typically are pertinent
to criminal jurisprudence").
31. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1827) ("[Ihe practice has
been, and so this Court understand [sic] the law to be, that the proceeding in
rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in
personam."); United States v. $152,160 U.S. Currency, 680 F. Supp. 354, 356
(D. Colo. 1988) ("A civil forfeiture proceeding is an in rem action that proceeds
on the legal fiction that the property itself is guilty of wrongdoing."); 1 KESSLER,
supra note 23, § 1.04 ("[Civil forfeiture] statutes authorize actions which have
as their object the 'offending' property, not individuals.") (citing United States
v. One Mercedes Benz 380 SEL, 604 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762
F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985)). "In rem" is "[a] technical term used to designate pro-
ceedings or actions against the thing, in contradiction to personal actions, which
are said to be in personam." BLACies LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 30, at 793.
32. United States v. Monsato, 852 F.2d 1400, 1412 n.1 (2d Cir. 1988) (Ma-
honey, J., dissenting) ("[T]he requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as
to the forfeitability of assets is the majority rule."), rev'd on other grounds, 491
U.S. 600 (1989); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1500 (10th Cir. 1988)
(applying the same burden of proof to a forfeiture under the federal criminal
forfeiture statue as the court would in any other criminal action); United States
v. Dunn, 802 F.2d 646, 647 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that criminal forfeitures re-
quire proof beyond a reasonable doubt as opposed to proof by a preponderance
of the evidence).
Nonetheless, some circuits consider criminal forefeitures to be an element
of the punishment rather than a separate offense, and follow the preponderance
of the evidence standard. United States v. Elgersma, 971 F.2d 690, 694 (11th
Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that criminal forfeiture under the criminal forfei-
ture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853, is part of the punishment and consequently the
government must only prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence);
United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1576 (9th Cir. 1989)
(same), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1003 (1990); United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d
869, 874-76 (3d Cir. 1987) (same).
33. The probable cause standard is the same in criminal cases and civil
forfeitures. Compare United States v. Riemer, 392 F. Supp. 1291, 1294 (S.D.
Ohio 1975) (defining probable cause as a set of probabilities grounded in the
factual and practical considerations that govern the decisions of reasonable and
prudent persons and is more than mere suspicion but less than the quantum of
evidence required for conviction) with United States v. $22,287 in U.S. Cur-
rency, 709 F.2d 442, 446-47 (6th Cir. 1983) (using same definition of probable
cause in a civil forfeiture action) and United States v. One 1978 Chevrolet Im-
pala, 614 F.2d 983, 984 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (same).
Law enforcement agencies are typically held to the probable cause stan-
dard when deciding whether to make an arrest. To convict, however, the gov-
ernment must prove its case "beyond a reasonable doubt." In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 361 (1970) ("The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be estab-
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illegal use.3 4 The property owner must then prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the property is not subject to
forfeiture.35
In addition to the lower burden of proof, civil forfeiture pro-
vides the government with many tactical advantages otherwise
unavailable in a criminal proceeding. For example, the govern-
ment may use hearsay evidence and a wider range of civil dis-
covery procedures in a civil forfeiture hearing.3 6 Courts may
also draw negative inferences if claimants choose not to speak in
their defense.3 7 Concerned with a need for fairness in civil for-
feiture proceedings,38 the Supreme Court has traditionally con-
lished by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as
a Nation.").
34. E.g., $22,287, 709 F.2d at 446-47 (finding government had established
probable cause to believe defendant was storing heroin at his home); 1978 Chev-
rolet Impala, 614 F.2d at 984 (finding only issue on appeal was whether govern-
ment had established probable cause that property was used for drug
activities); United States v. 2306 N. Eiffel Court, 602 F. Supp. 307, 308 (N.D.
Ga. 1985) (finding government established house purchased with proceeds
traceable to drug sales and thus forfeitable).
35. One Blue 1977 AMC Jeep CJ-5 v. United States, 783 F.2d 759,761 (8th
Cir. 1986) (shifting burden); accord United States v. 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803
F.2d 625, 629 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. $84,000 in U.S. Currency, 717
F.2d 1090, 1101 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 836 (1984); $22,287, 709
F.2d at 446.
36. 1 KESSLER, supra note 23, § 1.04.
37. In a criminal case, defendants may exercise their Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, and the court can not use their silence against
them. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 30-32 (1988); Lakeside v. Ore-
gon, 435 U.S. 333, 336-38 (1978); Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 292-93
(1939). In a civil forfeiture, however, courts may draw adverse inferences when
a claimant remains silent. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment does not bar adverse inferences against
claimants in civil actions who do not testify in response to the prosecutor's evi-
dence). This puts claimants who are also facing a criminal trial in the difficult
situation of having to choose whether to waive their Fifth Amendment rights
and risk making inculpating statements, or exercise them and risk losing their
property in the civil forfeiture. In Lot 5, 23 F.3d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 722 (1995), Savanah Wims faced a similar dilemma because
the government threatened possible criminal drug charges. Infra note 87.
38. Critics often condemn civil forfeiture for its perceived lack of fairness.
See e.g., Anthony J. Franze, Casualties of War?: Drugs, Civil Forfeiture, and the
Plight of the "Innocent Owner," 70 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 369, 372-73 (1994) (ar-
guing that the "innocent owner" provision of § 881(a)(7) does not sufficiently
protect the interests of truly innocent owners); Arthur W. Leach & John G. Mal-
colm, Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution to the Civil Forfeiture De-
bate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 241, 242 (1994) (pointing to the "legion" of critics);
Christine Meyer, Zero Tolerance for Forfeiture: A Call for Reform of Civil For-
feiture Law, 5 NoRE DAME J.L. ETHIsS & PuB. PoL'Y 853 (1991).
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strued civil forfeiture statutes narrowly to avoid harming the
constitutional rights of claimants.3 9
Although government use of civil forfeiture has expanded
greatly in the last two decades, three recent Supreme Court
cases significantly limit the Forfeiture Statute. In United States
v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue,40 the Court defined "innocent own-
ers"4 1 under the Forfeiture Statute as all owners, without limi-
tations or qualifications, not just bona fide purchasers for
value.42 In Austin v. United States,43 the Court held that forfeit-
ures constitute monetary punishments subject to the Eighth
Amendments excessive fines clause.44 Finally, in United States
39. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715,721-
22 (1971) (holding that certain criminal privileges could be invoked in a civil
forfeiture); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1885) (holding that a civil
forfeiture must be read as narrowly as possible so as to avoid violating the Fifth
Amendment); cf Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
688-89 (1974) (recognizing that the "'broad sweep' of forfeiture statutes [may]
give rise to serious constitutional questions"). Other courts frown on civil for-
feitures altogether. See, e.g., Nasir v. Sacramento Dist. Attorney, 11 Cal. App.
4th 976, 986 (Ct. App. 1992) ("[Olur law abhors a forfeiture.").
The recent Supreme Court decision of United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435 (1989), highlights one of the problems that arise when civil forfeitures be-
come punitive. In Halper, the Court barred a civil penalty under the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution, claiming that it constituted an illegal "sec-
ond punishment." Id. at 441-46. Other claimants have been able to success-
fully challenge civil forfeitures under the Double Jeopardy Clause as well. See,
e.g., United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir.
1994) (finding civil forfeiture penalty did not serve solely remedial function and
therefore constituted an unconstitutional second punishment).
40. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (plurality opinion). Joseph Brenner, a drug traf-
ficker, gave his girlfriend approximately $240,000 in drug proceeds in order to
buy a home. Id. at 1130. The girlfriend and her children were the only occu-
pants, and she was the sole owner of the house. Id. The government then
sought forfeiture of the house pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). The Court held
that the "innocent owner" defense applied to the girlfriend even though she was
not a bona fide purchaser for value. Id. at 1138.
41. See supra note 3 (identifying the "innocent owner" provision of the For-
feiture Statute).
42. 113 S. Ct. at 1138.
43. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). Richard Austin met with an undercover police
officer at his auto body shop in South Dakota. Id. at 2803. Austin agreed to sell
cocaine to the officer, left his shop, went to his mobile home, and returned to the
shop. He then sold two grams of cocaine to the officer for about $200. Id. A
search of the shop and the mobile home produced small amounts of marijuana
and cocaine, a revolver, drug paraphernalia, and $4700 in cash. Id. A jury con-
victed Austin of possession with intent to distribute and the court sentenced
him to seven years imprisonment. The government subsequently sought forfei-
ture of his body shop and mobile home. Id.
44. The Court did not allow forfeiture of the mobile home and body shop.
The Court reasoned that 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (7) was punitive in nature be-
cause it provided for an "innocent owner" defense. Id. at 2809. Thus, in this
1454 [Vol. 79:1447
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v. James Daniel Good Real Property,45 the Court ruled that ex
parte civil forfeiture violated the claimant's due process rights.46
With James Daniel Good, the Supreme Court effectively de-
stroyed the "guilty property"47 fiction by highlighting the direct
consequences that forfeitures have on individual property
owners.
B. Tim CHANGING FACE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The Forfeiture Statute derives its power from the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,48 which
provides the basis for federal preemption of state laws.4 9 From
its earliest decisions on the scope of preemption,50 the Supreme
case, the Court did not allow forfeiture on the basis that it would violate the
"excessive fines" clause of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2810.
45. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993). Authorities sought an in rem forfeiture of James
Good's home without notice several years after his conviction for the underlying
offense. Id. at 497. Despite the lapse in time, the forfeiture fell within the five
year statutory limitations period. Id.
46. The Supreme Court held that the seizure violated the Due Process
Clause. The government must give owners notice and a meaningful opportu-
nity to be heard in order to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. Id.
at 501-02. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution assure substantive and procedural fairness. Id.
at 497-98.
47. See supra note 31 (discussing in rem proceedings and the "guilty prop-
erty" fiction).
48. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution gives federal laws the power to preempt state laws. The text
reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of the State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
49. See KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION: A REPORT OF THE
APPELLATE JUDGES CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 5-14 (1991)
(discussing the historical underpinnings of the Supremacy Clause); JOSEPH F.
ZIMERMAN, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: THE SIENT REVOLUTION 11 (1991) ("The
power of Congress to preempt the states relative to these concurrent powers is
highlighted by Article VI of the Constitution ... ").
50. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In Gibbons, the United
States Supreme Court invalidated a New York statute regulating steamboat
traffic from New Jersey. The New York statute prohibited a federally licensed
boat from entering New York waters. Id. at 2.
Commentators generally regard Gibbons to be the first significant
Supremacy Clause decision. See MAURICE G. BAXTER, THE STEAMBOAT MONOP-
OLY: GIBBONS V. OGDEN, 1824 (1972); FREDERICK D. GOODWIN RIBBLE, STATE
AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE (1937); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY ch. 15 (1937); Thomas P. Campbell,
1995] 1455
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Court has made it clear that where there is a "direct collision"
between state and federal law, federal law prevails. 51 Courts
have defined "direct collisions" narrowly, limiting them to in-
stances in which it is impossible to comply with both the federal
and state laws.5 2 Where the statutory language does not explic-
itly delineate the scope of a federal law, courts must infer the
extent to which Congress intended to preempt any relevant
state law.5 3 Courts often infer Congress's intent by using their
own judgment and interpreting the statute's legislative
history.5 4
Jr., Chancellor Kent, Chief Justice Marshall and the Steamboat Cases, 25 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 497 (1974).
51. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall: "Should this collision exist...
the acts of NewYork must yield to the law of congress...." Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 210. Three years later, Chief Justice Marshall reinforced that no-
tion. "When [a collision between state and federal law] happens, that which is
not supreme must yield to that which is supreme. This great and universal
truth is inseparable from the nature of things." Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419, 448 (1827).
52. Where there is a direct collision, courts do not need to consider congres-
sional intent. See, e.g., Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S. 1 (1986) (hold-
ing state law reducing state workers' compensation liability for any federal
benefits received was in direct conflict with federal Death Benefits Act provid-
ing compensation "in addition" to benefits from any other source); Southland
Corp. v. Keating 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that federal Arbitration Act
preempts state law nullifying arbitration clauses); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (finding preemption analysis
"requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both fed-
eral and state regulations is a physical impossibility").
53. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 8 (1987) (stating
congressional intent is the "ultimate touchstone" of all inferred preemption
cases); accord Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987); Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985); Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85, 95 (1983).
Relatively few Supremacy Clause cases involve direct conflicts of law. For
the most part, courts have had to determine when and to what extent federal
agencies have acted within the scope of congressional intent. STARR ET AL.,
supra note 49, at 14-15.
54. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). In International Paper Co., the
Supreme Court looked for other sources of congressional intent to preempt state
common-law claims under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376
(West 1986 & Supp. 1989). 479 U.S. at 492; accord Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941). "Often, however, there is no explicit statement of preemption;
consequently, the federal courts and administrative agencies infer preemption
based on their own interpretations of congressional intent." U.S. ADvIsoRY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL STATUTORY PREEMP-
TION OF STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY: HISTORY, INVENTORY, AND ISSUES iii
(1992).
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Courts have developed three traditional doctrinal ap-
proaches to discern legislative intent in inferred preemption
cases: occupation of the- field, obstacle, and administrative.55
Preemption by occupation of the field occurs when Congress leg-
islates in a particular area so thoroughly that any state regula-
tion in that particular field is presumptively void.5 6 The courts
apply obstacle preemption when state law stands as an obstacle
to the full purposes and objectives of Congress, even though the
federal law may not "occupy the field."5 7 Obstacle preemption
differs from direct conflict preemption in that the state law need
only unduly burden the purpose behind federal law without
facially contradicting it.58 Finally, administrative agencies may
preempt state law with administrative rulings.5 9
55. See STARR ET AL., supra note 49, at 34-39 (discussing the failure of such
approach to harmonize the Court's requirements of clear legislative intent to
preempt).
56. The classic "occupation of the field" case is Rice, 331 U.S. 218. In Rice,
the Court held that because federal agencies licensed grain warehouses, the
states could not regulate them. Id. at 234-36. The Court pointed out that fed-
eral regulation of grain warehouses was "so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." Id. at
230.
Federal law most often "occupies the field" when it involves an issue of pe-
culiar federal interest such as immigration or international relations. For ex-
ample, foreign affairs and the regulation of aliens are areas of particular federal
interest. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 52. In Hines, the court struck down the Penn-
sylvania Alien Registration Act of 1940, which required aliens to register with
state authorities by holding that the legislation affected international relations
and thus "demand[ed] broad national authority." Id. at 68. The court effec-
tively held that where the federal government has a strong sovereign interest,
state law could not even complement federal law. Id. at 66-67.
57. International Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 493. In International Paper Co.,
Vermont property owners filed a state law claim against a New York paper mill
that was discharging pollutants into a lake bordered by both states. Id. at 483-
84. The Court held their claims invalid, because Congress had intended "to
'establish an all-encompassing program of water pollution regulation.'" Id. at
492 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981)).
58. Id. at 492.
59. Administrative agencies may preempt state and local laws pursuant to
official and legitimate duties "unless it appears from the statute [that created
the agency] or its legislative history [that the preemption] is not one that Con-
gress would have sanctioned." United States v. Shinier, 367 U.S. 374, 383
(1961).
Notwithstanding formal preemption doctrine, the Supreme Court has often
shifted the balance of power between the states and federal government. Com-
mentators generally divide the Supreme Court's shifting perspective on the pre-
emption doctrine into the following four phases:
First, early in this century, the Court's analysis was merely limited to
discerning whether state law fell within a field of congressional regula-
tion. Second, during roughly the 1930s, the Court focused on whether
there was a congressional purpose or intent to displace state law. Dur-
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In recent years, the Supreme Court created an alternative
to the traditional preemption doctrines: the clear statement
rule. The Court announced the clear statement rule in Gregory
v. Ashcroft,60 holding that courts must find a clear congressional
mandate whenever federal legislation "intrudes on traditional
state authority."61 The area of traditional state authority in
Ashcroft was the election and regulation of state officials.
One year afterAshcroft, the Court added state police powers
to the areas of "traditional state authority" subject to the clear
statement rule. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,62 the Court
recognized direct conflict preemption, that when state law di-
ing the third phase, between the early 1940s and early 1970s, the
Supreme Court shifted to a more federally-oriented standard, and ex-
panded their implied preemption jurisprudence. Finally, since the
Burger Era, it appears that the Court again shifted its analysis by em-
bracing presumptions against preemption and requiring clear congres-
sional intent to preempt state law.
John A. Chatowski, Cipollone and the Clear Statement Rule: Doctrinal Anom-
aly or New Development in Federal Preemption?, 44 SYRACUsE L. Rnv. 769, 773
(1993) (citing William W. Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting
Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 623, 624
(1975)); see also PAUL R. BENSON, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE, 1937-1970 (1970) (discussing the historical phases of the preemption
doctrine).
Preemption cases have once again become a volatile issue. "Compared to
twenty years ago, the number of preemption cases on the Supreme Court's
docket has increased by a factor of four." STARR Er AL., supra note 49, at 1.
60. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). In Ashcroft, Missouri state judges brought an ac-
tion against the governor challenging the mandatory retirement provision in
the state Constitution. The judges based their cause of action under the Fed-
eral Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Id. at 455-56.
Using traditional notions of federalism, the Supreme Court held, among other
things, that the federal government did not have the power to regulate Mis-
souri's governmental functions. Id. at 473. The Court defined those functions
as areas of traditional state interest. Id. at 471-72.
61. Id. at 468. The Court relied on Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), to assert that Congress must state its intent
clearly before courts will enforce the Fourteenth Amendment in a way that
might intrude upon traditional state authority. Id.
More recent decisions have limited the areas of "traditional state authority"
to laws that "impact a state's self-identification as a sovereignty." Reich v. New
York, 3 F.3d 581, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1993) (refusing to interpret Ashcroft to resur-
rect undue deference to state's political decisions), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1187
(1994); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 987 F.2d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that
Ashcroft made "unequivocally clear... the narrowness of its holding").
62. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992). In Cipollone, Rose and Antonio Cipollone al-
leged in federal court that Mrs. Cipollone developed lung cancer by smoking
cigarettes made by three cigarette manufacturers, including Liggett Group, Inc.
Id. at 2613-14. At issue in the case was whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling
Act preempted Cipollone's state common-law claims. Id. at 2614. The Supreme
Court held that it did not. Id. at 2625.
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rectly conflicts with federal law it is "without effect."63 Yet, with
respect to inferred preemption, the Court stated that any pre-
emption analysis begins with the presumption that federal laws
do not supersede "historic [state] police powers ... unless that
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."64 Rather than
construing federal law in the broadest manner possible, the
Court sought to "identify the domain" of state law that Congress
intended to preempt.65
The courts are not alone in advocating the clear statement
rule. Both the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations and an American Bar Association task force recently
recommended adopting a broad and powerful version of the
rule.66 In response, the Supreme Court further refined the clear
statement rule in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.67 The BFP
Court classified the regulation of real estate as an "essential
state interest" that federal statutes could not preempt absent a
clear congressional mandate. 68 The Court noted that the secur-
ity of real estate titles and the power to regulate and control
that security "inheres in the very nature of [state]
government."6 9
63. Id. at 2617 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
64. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
65. Id. at 2618.
66. STARR ET AL., supra note 49, at 55-56; U.S. ADVISORY CoMMIssIoN ON
INTERGOvERNmENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 54, at 2. Congress created the U.S.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1959 to monitor the
operation of the American federal system and to recommend improvements. Id.
at 88. It is an independent and bipartisan body composed of 26 members: nine
representing the federal government; 14 representing state and local govern-
ment; and three representing the general public. Id.
67. 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994) (5-4 decision). In BFP, a Chapter 11 debtor
brought a fraudulent transfer claim on the theory that the price received at the
federal foreclosure sale was less than the "reasonably equivalent value" of the
property as mandated by 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2). Id. at 1759-60. The majority
opinion held that the foreclosure sale price conclusively established a "reason-
ably equivalent value" for the property, as long as the state's foreclosure laws
were met. Id. at 1764. The Court added that in order to preempt a traditional
state regulation, the federal statutory purpose must be 'clear and manifest.'"
Id. at 1765 (quoting English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)).
The dissent criticized the majority for partially relying on Ashcroft. The
dissent wanted to limit Ashcroft's scope to state interests that are "essential to
their independence." Id. at 1775 n.17. The majority responded that "[tlhis ig-
nores the fact that it is not state authority over debtor-creditor law in general
that is at stake in this case, but the essential sovereign interest in the security
and stability of title to land." Id. at 1765 n.8 (citing American Land Co. v. Zeiss,
219 U.S. 47, 60 (1911)).
68. Id. at 1764.
69. Id. at 1764-65 (quoting American Land Co., 219 U.S. at 60). As a re-
sult, California was free to determine the fair market value of foreclosed prop-
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C. STATE HoMsTEAD PROTECTON
To protect their citizens' security in title to real estate, some
states have created constitutional or statutory "homestead ex-
emption" provisions that exclude homesteads from forced sale or
governmental forfeiture.70 Courts in those states generally con-
strue homestead protection liberally in favor of the home-
owner.71 In several state cases, courts have prevented state law
enforcement agencies from seizing a homestead, even when the
property significantly facilitated an underlying crime.72
erty, even though the resale agency forclosed the property pursuant to federal
law. After Cipollone, legal commentators argued whether the clear statement
rule was a new development or simply a doctrinal anomaly. Chatowski, supra
note 59, at 782 (arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt an unambiguous
and broad rule requiring "unequivocal" language, "plain to anyone reading the
Act," for federal preemption of state law). With BFP, the Court dispelled any
notion that the rule is a doctrinal anomaly.
70. For example, the Florida Constitution provides in pertinent part that:
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court,
and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for
the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted
for the purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations con-
tracted for house, field or other labor performed on the realty, the fol-
lowing property owned by a natural person:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of
one hundred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon,
which shall not be reduced without the owner's consent by reason of
subsequent inclusion in a municipality; or if located within a muncipal-
ity, to the extent of one-half acre of contiguous land, upon which the
exemption shall be limited to the residence of the owner or [the
owner's] family.
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4. For examples of statutory homestead exemptions, see,
e.g., IowA CODE § 809 (1991); OKL& STAT. tit. 31, §§ 1, 2 (1991).
71. One Florida court remarked: "[O]ur courts have always held that
homestead laws should be construed liberally in the interest of the family and
in favor of the person entitled to them." Vandiver v. Vincent, 139 So. 2d 704,
707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (citing Jetton Lumber Co. v. Hall, 64 So. 440 (Fla.
1914)).
72. See Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992) (prohibiting for-
feiture of a homestead under Florida's anti-racketeering statute); In re Bly, 456
N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1990) (prohibiting forfeiture by construing forfeiture statute
narrowly and homestead exemption liberally); State ex rel. Braun v. 918 N.
County Line Rd., 840 P.2d 453 (Kan. 1992) (holding that state constitution pro-
vides for three exceptions to absolute homestead protection and forfeiture is not
one of them); State ex rel. Means v. Ten Acres of Land, 877 P.2d 597 (Okla.
1994) (finding that courts should liberally construe homestead laws while
strictly construing forfeiture laws).
Nonetheless, two state appellate courts have taken the opposite view, hold-
ing that legislators did not intend to shield criminal activity with homestead
laws. See In re 1632 N. Santa Rita, 801 P.2d 432 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (conclud-
ing that use of a homestead exemption to avoid forfeiture is against public pol-
icy); People v. Allen 767 P.2d 798, 800 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (protecting
homestead against "debt, contract, or civil obligation," but not forfeiture). It is
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American citizens have historically enjoyed the benefits of
home ownership and secure titles to real estate.73 The Supreme
Court recognized the benefits of home ownership more than a
century ago when it remarked that "[t]he great end for which
[people] entered into society was to secure their property."74 De-
spite occasional federal regulation in the field of property
rights, 75 states have traditionally defined the scope and nature
of those rights. As a result, federal courts incorporate state law
to define a property owner's interest.76
The basic concern behind state homestead protection is fam-
ily welfare.77 State courts have emphasized that constitutional
interesting to note, however, that both Allen and Santa Rita relied on the rea-
soning in DeRuyter v. State, 521 So. 2d 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). The
Florida Supreme Court, however, subsequently overruled DeRuyter. See
Means, 877 P.2d at 599.
73. Steven Kessler argues:
[P]rotecting real property from government action is not new. It is a
principle that dates to the times of Plato, who, in The Republic, defined
an oligarchy as 'a government resting on a valuation of property, in
which the rich have power and the poor [person] is deprived of it.'
Some two thousand years later, Sir Edward Coke coined the axiom, 'a
man's house is his castle,' which has become part of our culture.
1 KESSLER, supra note 23, § 1.05[3]. A post-World War II information pamphlet
published by the Department of the Interior described homesteading as "a tra-
dition of the American way of life" and "a part of the indomitable pioneer spirit
of earlier days." U.S. DEFT OF THE INTERIOR, HOMESTEADING IN CONTWENrAL
UNITED STATES: INFORMATION BuLLETiN No. 3, at 1 (1948).
Government agents traditionally encounter difficulties when seizing a
home. Kessler argues that the Fourth Amendment preclusion of illegal
searches and seizures embraces the special role of real property in America.
Steven L. Kessler, Protecting the Homestead from Forfeiture, 212 N.Y. L.J. 52,
Sept. 14, 1994, at 1, 4.
74. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (quoting Lord Cam-
den's decision in Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King's Messengers, re-
ported at length in 19 HOWELL'S STATE TIALS 1029 (1765) (Michaelmas Term)).
75. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (the Fair Housing
Act).
76. Courts deciding issues under the Forfeiture Statute have held that
state law defines an owner's property interest. United States v. Lot 9, 919 F.2d
994, 1000 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that state law controls an owner's interest in
property, even in federal drug-related forfeitures). The court in Lot 9 applied
state law principles of property interests to determine whether spouse of a drug
dealer could assert an "innocent owner" defense under the Forfeiture Statute.
Id. The court added that it should protect an owner's interests under state law
to the extent that they do not "contravene the federal forfeiture scheme." Id.
Accord United States v. 1977 Porsche Carerra, 911, 946 F.2d 30, 34 (5th Cir.
1991); United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1518 (11th Cir.
1990); United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d 659, 664 n.4 (3d Cir. 1989)
(Greenberg, J. dissenting).
77. Florida courts have often stated this rationale in a variety of cases. See
In re Hersch, 23 B.R. 42, 45 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (noting the humanitarian-
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or statutory exemptions provide a "safety net" to keep families
from losing their homes during difficult times or to protect fami-
lies from the consequences of one family member's wrongdo-
ing.78 Courts have also recognized that in addition to protecting
individual families, homestead protection increases overall so-
cial stability.7 9 The public's reaction to the homeless crisis
largely echoes past concerns about the sanctity of the American
home.8 0 By taking legislative action to stem the flow of home-
ism behind homestead exemption laws); Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 136 So.
353, 355 (Fla. 1931) (same); Vandiver v. Vincent, 139 So. 2d 704, 707 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1962) (same). One legal encyclopedia best articulates the purpose of
protecting homesteads:
Homestead laws are founded upon considerations of public policy,
their purpose being to promote the stability and welfare of the state by
encouraging property ownership and independence on the part of the
citizen, and by preserving a home where the family may be sheltered
and live beyond the reach of economic misfortune. The homestead ex-
emption is designed to benefit not only the head of the household, but
also the family, and to protect the family home. The laws are intended
to secure to the householder a home for himself and family.... [T]heir
purpose is to secure the home to the family even at the sacrifice ofjust
demands, the preservation of the home being deemed of paramount
importance.
29 FLA. JuR. 2D. Homesteads § 3 (1981).
78. For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently dismissed the for-
feiture of a homestead under a state civil forfeiture statute. State ex rel. Means
v. Ten Acres of Land, 877 P.2d 597, 601-02 (Okla. 1994). The state attempted to
seize and forfeit all of their real property, including their homestead, pursuant
to the Oklahoma Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Id. at 598; see OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 2-101, 2-503(a)(8) (West Supp. 1995). In denying the for-
feiture, the court reasoned that the "constitutional and statutory provisions for
homestead were made for the purpose of protecting the entire family." 877 P.2d
at 601 (citing In re Carother's Estate, 167 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1946)). The court
based its reasoning on the maxim that a family should not suffer because of one
person's wrongdoing. Id. (citing Cassady v. Morris, 91 P. 888 (Okla. 1907)).
Courts in Iowa, Florida, and Kansas have reached similar conclusions. See
supra note 72 (citing cases). See also Carothers'Estate, 167 P.2d at 899 (noting
that the homestead provisions were drafted for the benefit of the entire family);
Cassady v. Morris, 91 P. 888 (Okla. 1907) (holding that the homestead of a fam-
ily is exempt to the family and cannot be taken on attachment for the tort of the
husband or father).
79. In re McAtee, 154 B.R. 346, 347-48 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (noting that the
homestead exemption "furthers important public policy considerations of pro-
moting the stability and welfare of state ... by preserving a home where a
family may live beyond reaches of economic misfortune") (citation omitted); In
re Tierney, 263 N.W.2d 533, 534 (Iowa 1978) (stating that homesteads "provide
a margin of safety to the family, not only for the benefit of the family, but for the
public welfare and social benefit which accrues to the state by having families
secure in their homes") (quoting In re McClain's Estate, 262 N.W. 666, 669
(Iowa 1935)).
80. A federal court recently made the connection between homelessness
and civil forfeitures of homesteads when it stated that "[slociety already has
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less persons, Congress itself recognized that having a home is
sacrosanct.81
11. UNITED STATES v. LOT 5, FOX GROVE: STATE
HOMESTEAD PROTECTION FALLS VICTIM TO
THE FORFEITURE STATUTE
In United States v. Lot 5, Fox Grove,82 the Eleventh Circuit
determined of whether the Forfeiture Statute preempts Flor-
ida's constitutional homestead exemption. 3 In federal district
court, the government alleged that Savanah Wims's home facili-
tated drug transactions in violation of § 881(a)(7). 84 The govern-
ment also intended to indict her on criminal charges for her
drug-related activities.8 5  Consequently, Wims stipulated to
probable cause in the civil forfeiture to prevent civil discovery of
potentially harmful information that the government could use
against her at her criminal trial.86 Because Wims did not pres-
ent any evidence contradicting the government's evidence, the
district court ordered her home forfeited to the United States.8 7
more than it wants or can take care of, and this court is wary of adding the
[claimant] to the list of the homeless." United States v. 461 Shelby County Rd.,
857 F. Supp. 935, 938 (N.D. Ala. 1994). The court added that "[it] does not
mean to condone what the [claimants] did, but the fact that drug trafficking
cannot be condoned does not lead inexorably to the taking away of the only
residence of two small drug traffickers." Id.
Legal and social commentators have recognized homelessness to be one of
America's biggest problems. See, e.g., Mary E. Hombs, Federal Policy for the
Homeless, 1 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 57 (1989).
81. In 1987, Congress passed the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assist-
ance Act. Act of July 22, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 1987 U.S.C.C-.AN. (101
Stat.) 482 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 11301) ("McKinney Act"). Congress
passed the McKinney Act to "provide urgently needed assistance to protect and
improve the lives and safety of the homeless." Id. The McKinney Act provides
housing assistance to the homeless by using space in vacant public buildings to
house them. Id. With the McKinney Act, Congress recognized that it "has a
clear responsibility and an existing capacity" to help meet "an immediate and
unprecedented crisis due to the lack of shelter for a growing number of individ-
uals and families." 42 U.S.C. § 11301(a)(1) (1988).
82. 23 F.3d 359 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 722 (1995).
83. Id. at 361.
84. Id. at 360.
85. Id. at 361.
86. Id. The government had enough evidence to establish probable cause.
One of Wims's stepsons, Tim Wims, confessed to leaving drug proceeds at the
property. Id. at 360. Tim Wims also stated that Ms. Wims knew that he and
her husband Roosevelt Wims had participated in drug transactions while at the
residence. Id. See supra note 33 (describing the probable cause standard).
87. 23 F.3d at 361. Savanah Wims faced the dilemma of remaining silent
and automatically losing her homestead or facing the possibility that the gov-
ernment would use her statements against her at a later criminal trial. Id.
1995] 1463
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1447
On appeal, Wims argued that Florida's Constitution pro-
tected her homestead from forfeiture.8 8 Wims asserted that the
trial court's decision was inconsistent with the United States
Supreme Court decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft.8 9 The court re-
sponded that Ashcroft was "limited to federal laws impacting a
state's self-identification as a sovereignty,"90 and that Florida's
constitutional homestead exemption was a substantive policy
choice rather than a means of sovereign self-identification. 9' Ac-
cordingly, rather than applying the clear statement rule, the Lot
5 court looked to traditional preemption jurisprudence. 92
Ironically, in support of its decision to apply traditional pre-
emption jurisprudence, the Lot 5 court relied heavily on dicta in
the recent clear statement rule case, Cippolone v. Liggett
Group.93 The court purported to apply the "direct conflict" doc-
trine, stating that its "sole inquiry [was] whether the federal
and state provisions conflict."94 The court then relied on what it
described as the "plain language" of the Forfeiture Statute, stat-
ing that because § 881(a)(7) refers to "all real property," it pre-
empted Florida's homestead protection.95
The court also looked to the legislative history of the federal
law to support its conclusion that § 881(a)(7) preempts state
homestead laws. It remarked that Congress must have in-
tended the courts to read § 881(a)(7) broadly96 because Congress
enacted the federal drug forfeiture law to "eliminate the statu-
tory limitations and ambiguities" that have frustrated law en-
forcement agencies. 97 The court concluded that because the
legislative history indicated that forfeiture of a "house" would
Many claimants face this problem whenever the government chooses to pursue
the civil forfeiture before commencing the criminal action. See supra note 37
(explaining the dilemma claimants face between waiving or exercising their
Fifth Amendment rights when faced with the prospect of civil forfeiture).
88. 23 F.3d at 361.
89. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). For a discussion ofAshcroft, see supra notes 60-61
and accompanying text.
90. 23 F.3d at 362.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
94. Id. at 362. For a discussion of the "direct conflict" preemption doctrine,
see supra note 52.
95. 23 F.3d at 363.
96. The court relied on United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 609, 614
(1989) (holding that language in a federal criminal forfeiture statute precluded
exemption of assets used to pay attorney's fees because the term "any property"
is broad and unambiguous). 23 F.3d at 363 n.6.
97. Id. at 363 (quoting S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 192, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3374, 3375).
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provide a powerful deterrent to potential criminals, Congress
must have intended to extend civil forfeiture to state protected
homesteads. 98
I. LIMITING FEDERAL FORFEITURES OF
PROTECTED HOMESTEADS
The Lot 5 court took a step in the wrong direction when it
held that § 881(a)(7) unequivocally preempts state homestead
laws. The court disregarded recent Supreme Court rulings that
narrow the scope of preemption. The court also misapplied
traditional preemption doctrines by failing to identify any sub-
stantive congressional intent to override state homestead law.
Considering the traditional role of the states in regulating prop-
erty interests, courts should protect those interests to the extent
that Congress does not clearly indicate its intent to negate them.
A. THE LOT 5 COURT ERRED IN ITS PREEMPTION ANALYsis
1. The Clear Statement Rule Comes of Age
The Supreme Court has progressively strengthened the
clear statement doctrine.99 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.100
provides the most recent example of this movement. A strong
clear statement rule is of paramount importance in maintaining
the checks and balances necessary to avoid a concentration of
power in the federal government. 101 As the Supreme Court em-
98. Id.
99. Although the Supreme Court has recognized the limited scope of Ash-
croft, it has generally widened the scope of "traditional state interests" that re-
quire a clear statement by Congress in order to be preempted. See supra notes
60-69 and accompanying text (discussing clear statement rule).
Commentators have generally praised the clear statement trend. U.S. AD-
VISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 54, at 13;
STARR ET AL., supra note 49, at 40-56; Chatowski, supra note 59, at 800-01 (ar-
guing that the Supreme Court should adopt an unambiguous and broad rule
requiring unequivocal language, "plain to anyone reading the act," for federal
preemption of state law) (citation omitted).
100. 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1765 (1994). For a discussion of BFP and its holding,
see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
101. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("Perhaps the principal
benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of government power.").
See generally SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMER-
*cAN FEDERALISM (1993) (treatise discussing federalism in general); PATRICIA A.
LUCIE, FREEDOM AND FEDERALISM: CONGRESS AND COURTS, 1861-1866 (1986)
(same); DAVID B. WALKER, TOWARD A FUNCTIONING FEDERALISM (1981) (same).
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court struck down a federal law that pur-
ported to regulate gun possession in schools on the basis that the federal gov-
ernment is one of the enumerated powers and that the Commerce Clause does
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phasized in BFP, "[W]here the intent to override [a state stat-
ute] is doubtful, our federal system demands deference to long
established traditions of state regulation."10 2
Considering that the clear statement rule hinges on
whether a traditional state interest is involved, 10 3 the main is-
sue in preemption cases has become defining the areas of tradi-
tional state interest. The Supreme Court in BFP clearly
demarcated property regulation as an area of traditional state
interest by refusing to preempt California's right to define fair
market value in a federal foreclosure. 0 4
Similarly, a traditional state right, the right to a secure title
in real property, was precisely the interest at stake in Lot 5.
Yet, the court failed to recognize the state interest and apply the
clear statement rule. Although the Lot 5 court recognized the
Supreme Court's limited clear statement rule in Ashcroft, it did
not mention the Court's expansion of the rule in Cippolone.
0 5
Relying solely on the Ashcroft decision, the court severely lim-
ited the clear statement rule by deciding that Florida's interest
in protecting homesteads was "not a means of sovereign defini-
tion."10o Consequently, the court failed to consider the tradi-
not give it "a general police power of the sort retained by the states." United
States v. Lopez, No. 93-1260, 1995 WL 238424, at *11 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1995). The
significance of the decision is that the court reinforced the essential balance
between the federal government and the individual states.
102. 114 S. Ct. at 1765-66. 'Likewise, when faced with two plausible inter-
pretations of a federal criminal statute, [the court] will generally take the alter-
native that does not force [it] to impute an intention to Congress... to regulate,
conduct traditionally and ably regulate by the states." Lopez, 1995 WL 238424,
at *36 (Souter, J. dissenting). Other branches of the federal government have
joined the judiciary in demanding more deference to state law. President Clin-
ton recently signed a law reducing the federal government's ability to pass un-
funded mandates that would burden the states. Unfunded Mandate Reform
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995). In addition, politically con-
servative commentators are now calling themselves "populists," and urging a
return to greater state self-governance. See, e.g., Richard A. Viguerie, A Popu-
list, and Proud of It, NATL REV., Oct. 19, 1984, at 42 (defining populists as those
urging "a return of power from the Federal Government to the states and locali-
ties and to the individual").
103. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text (discussing the develop-
ment of the clear statement rule and the gradual development of the "tradi-
tional state interest" concept).
104. 114 S. Ct. at 1765.
105. United States v. Lot 5, Fox Grove, 23 F.3d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 722 (1995). The court relied heavily on Cippolone dicta
to describe traditional preemption jurisprudence without mentioning the actual
holding in Cippolone. Id. at 361-62.
106. Id. at 362.
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tional state role of regulating property rights and protecting the
homestead.
2. The Lot 5 Approach: Giving Preemption the Benefit of the
Doubt
Rather than deferring to Florida's interest in homestead
protection under the clear statement rule, the Lot 5 court chose
to rely on traditional preemption jurisprudence.-0 7 Yet, even us-
ing the traditional doctrines of preemption, the Lot 5 court falls
short in its analysis by considering merely whether § 881(a)(7)
and the homestead exemption directly conflict.-1
Certainly the term "real property," as contained in
§ 881(a)(7), may encompass homesteads. Nevertheless, courts
have stated that a "direct conflict" exists only when it is a physi-
cal impossibility to comply with both federal and state law.' 0 9
As such, the Forfeiture Statute and Florida's homestead exemp-
tion do not directly conflict. 110 Much in the same way that the
homestead exemption does not preclude enforcement of the state
drug-related forfeiture statute,"'3 the homestead exemption
does not preclude federal agents from seizing a vast array of real
property. A true "direct conflict" would exist only if Florida ex-
empted all real property from forfeiture.
Furthermore, although purporting to apply a direct conflict
analysis, the Lot 5 court looked to congressional intent underly-
ing § 881(a)(7), an irrelevant factor in direct conflict cases."i 2
Direct conflict cases concern only the effect, and not the purpose,
of opposing laws."33 Perhaps the court realized that under a
proper traditional preemption analysis, it should have applied
obstacle preemption.11 4
107. Id.
108. Id. at 362-63.
109. See supra notes 51-52 (discussing "direct conflict" preemption).
110. The "direct conflict" cases are generally much more narrow in scope
and involve instances where it is a "physical impossibility" to comply with both
federal and state laws. See supra note 52 (listing cases that involved a direct
conflict preemption).
111. Florida's state civil drug-related forfeiture statute operates despite the
state's homestead exemption. Consequently, it is not "physically impossible" to
comply with both laws. See supra note 76 (describing cases where state home-
stead exemptions limited but did not nullify the state civil drug-related forfei-
ture statute).
112. 23 F.3d at 363.
113. See supra notes 52-53 (describing direct conflict preemption).
114. The other two traditional approaches to implied preemption do not lend
themselves to the facts in Lot 5. The Forfeiture Statute does not occupy the
field of forfeiture law so as to make all state forfeitures invalid. States often use
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3. Obstacle Preemption: Congressional Intent and the
Presumption of State Sovereignty
Obstacle preemption analysis requires a determination of
whether the state regulation unduly burdens or "serves as an
obstacle" to the purpose behind federal law.115 Although a
homestead exemption arguably serves as an obstacle to facial
compliance with § 881(a)(7), it does not unduly burden the pur-
pose behind the Forfeiture Statute. Congress clearly intended
the Forfeiture Statute to increase prosecutorial efficacy, but the
legislative history of § 881(a)(7) does not indicate any substan-
tive intent to extend federal civil forfeiture to include all homes,
even those of "small time" drug dealers.
In fact, the legislative history of § 881(a)(7) reveals a con-
gressional intent to focus on large scale drug operations such as
"a secluded barn to store tons of marihuana" or "a manufactur-
ing laboratory for amphetamines." 116 Congress emphasized its
focus on real property "indispensable to the commission of a ma-
jor drug offense."117 Other drug laws harshly target small-time
dealers.118 Congress wanted § 881(a)(7) to strike at the eco-
nomic base of large scale drug operations.
When Congress intends to preempt state property regula-
tions, it usually does so on the face of the statute.119 Recogniz-
ing the traditional state role in regulating property interests,
federal courts have generally deferred to state law in defining an
owner's property interest, even in drug forfeiture actions. 120
state forfeiture statutes that are very similar to federal forfeiture statutes. See
supra notes 70-72, 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing state forfeiture
cases); see also supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional
preemption doctrine of "occupation of the field"). Nor does the case involve an
administrative forfeiture. See supra note 59 (discussing administrative
preemptions).
115. See supra note 56 (citing an "occupation of the field" case and how it
applies the doctrine).
116. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 192 reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3378.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Federal criminal drug penalties are particularly harsh. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (2) (1988); 21 U.S.C-A. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii) (1988 & West Supp.
1993); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (1987) (United States Sentencing Guidelines drug
quantity tables).
119. With the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Con-
gress specifically wrote on the face of the statute that the government had the
power to forfeit property "irrespective of any provision of state law." See supra
note 13 (discussing the bankruptcy and RICO statutes).
120. See supra note 76.
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More significantly, the Supreme Court had those interests in
mind in BFP:
Absent a clear statutory requirement to the contrary, we must assume
the validity of this state-law regulatory background and take due ac-
count of its effect. "The existence and force and function of established
institutions of local government are always in the consciousness of
lawmakers and, while their weight may vary, they may never be com-
pletely overlooked in the task of interpretation."1
2
'
Although the courts can not expect each member of Congress to
know all the intricacies of state property regulation, the home-
stead exemption should nonetheless exist "in the consciousness
of lawmakers."
State homestead exemptions are notorious, especially in
Florida.122 Given this well-known protection, the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1984 and its legislative history do not
contain a sufficiently clear expression of Congress's intent to
override state homestead exemptions. The legislative history of§ 881(a)(7) indicates that lawmakers intended to take the eco-
nomic incentive out of drug trafficking.123 The Lot 5 court, how-
ever, reads § 881(a)(7) too broadly by including all homesteads
within its reach.
B. THE LOT 5 COURT Too QUICKLY SACRIFICED STATE
HomEsTEs' LAw
1. Narrowing the Scope of Civil Forfeiture
Considering the relatively low government burden in civil
forfeitures, courts should read civil forfeiture statutes as nar-
rowly as possible. Furthermore, courts should not construe civil
forfeiture statutes in light of criminal forfeiture statutes, as the
121. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1762 (quoting Davies
Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 154 (1944)).
122. When very rich people go spectacularly bust, they usually manage
to hold on to their mansions .... Florida and Texas both have a gener-
ous homestead act .... Houston developer Melvin Powers successfully
held a $68 million office building as his 'home' for a while during the
early 1980s [and] ... Donald Trump has successfully shielded from his
creditors his palatial Palm Beach estate worth millions.
Randall Lane, Stiff thy creditor, FORBES, Oct. 18, 1993, at 64, 66. See also
James R. Hagy, What's It Going to Be? We Searched for the Most Important
Trends Influencing Florida's Future, FLA. TREND, Dec. 1993, at 40 (alluding to
the notoriety of Florida's homestead exemption).
123. "Clearly, if law enforecement efforts to combat racketeering and drug
trafficking are to be successful, they must include an attack on the economic
aspects of these crimes. Forfeiture is the mechanism through which such an




Lot 5 court did.124 Although civil and criminal forfeitures
achieve the same end, they provide the property owner vastly
different levels of protection.125 Whereas criminal forfeitures
require the government to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt, civil forfeitures only require the government to demon-
strate probable cause. 126 Criminal trials also provide the de-
fendant with constitutional safeguards.1 27 Courts can therefore
read criminal forfeiture statutes more broadly than their civil
counterparts.- 28
2. Protecting the Homestead
Forfeiture of a home often leaves innocent parties, typically
drug dealers' families, without a place to live. 129 The govern-
ment premised the war on drugs on the notion that drugs de-
stroy family and social welfare. 130  Ironically, efforts at
enforcement have arguably produced as much of a negative ef-
fect on family and social structure as the drugs themselves. 131
Meanwhile, state legislators drafted homestead exemption laws
124. United States v. Lot 5, Fox Grove, 23 F.3d 359, 363 (11th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 722 (1995). See supra note 96 (discussing the criminal
forfeiture case of United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989)).
125. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (differentiating between
civil and criminal forfeitures).
126. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (discussing the relative
burdens of proof in civil and criminal forfeiture cases).
127. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional
protections in criminal trials).
128. En fact, the Supreme Court recently limited the scope and power of civil
forfeitures under the Excessive Fines and Due Process Clauses of the United
States Constitution. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (citing
cases).
The Court has also limited civil forfeitures under the Double Jeopardy
Clause by finding that they constitute an unconstitutional double punishment.
The courts in the double jeopardy cases held that the government could not use
a "compensatory" civil statute for punitive purposes. See supra note 39. By
defining civil forfeitures as punitive, the Court has created a dilemma. If
§ 881(a)(7) forfeitures are truly "punishment," they must be prohibited alto-
gether because they deny claimants the presumption of innocence and due pro-
cess rights of a criminal trial. Although the Supreme Court has not yet
explicitly classified the Forfeiture Statute as punitive, the Ninth Circuit has.
See United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir. 1994).
129. "In reality, the people who are most affected by drug forfeitures are the
parents, spouses, employers, mortgagees, banks, and car rental companies of
small time drug traffickers." John J. Kerrigan, When Drug Forfeitures Touch
the Eittle Guy', XVII PA. L. WKLY. 37, Sept. 12, 1994, at 6.
130. See supra notes 24-26 (sources that describe the effects of the war on
drugs and suggest government motives).
131. See powell & Hershenov, supra note 26, at 609-12 (noting that "[miany
... innocent [minority youths] will... have their lives altered by living in
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with the protection of families in mind,' 3 2 and courts have real-
ized that homestead protection also stabilizes overall social
structures. 1
33
Although § 881(a)(7) contains a provision protecting "inno-
cent owners," it does not compensate for the other inequities of
civil forfeiture. For example, spouses with a property interest
have often prevented the forfeiture of their homesteads, particu-
larly in states that recognize tenancies by the entirety. 34 Yet,
the innocent owner exception 35 does not protect innocent chil-
dren whose interest in their home, although not legal, is as sig-
nificant as their parents' interest.' 36 Considering that civil
forfeiture does not depend on the culpability of the claimant,'
37
allowing "innocent owners" an exemption while not taking inno-
cent children into account makes no sense. 138 Homestead for-
feitures potentially hurt children as much as "innocent" spouses.
In light of the many inequities of current homestead forfeit-
ures, courts must develop a new approach in applying the For-
feiture Statute. This approach must take into account the
significant state interest in homesteads.
C. A NEW APPROACH TO SECTION 881(A)(7) FoRFEIUREs:
HONOR THE STATE's HoMEsTEAD PROTECTION
1. Reassessing Parties' Burdens in a Civil Forfeiture
Proceeding
Considering the combination of strong state interest in
homestead protection and the lack of congressional directive in
interpreting the Forfeiture Statute, courts should limit the scope
of § 881(a)(7). Critics have recently denounced the government's
militarized ghettos where their lives and liberties remain hostage to police and
drug violence").
132. See supra part .C (discussing legislative intent and family protection
behind homestead exemptions).
133. See supra note 80 (citing case recognizing a connection between forfeit-
ures and homelessness).
134. See United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1518 (11th
Cir. 1990) (holding that federal drug forfeitures did not preempt Florida's law
on tenancies by the entirety, effectively preventing the forfeiture of any portion
of the innocent spouse's interest in the property).
135. See supra note 3 (noting the "innocent owner" provision of § 881(a)(7)).
136. The Supreme Court implied that innocent occupants are protected in
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1134-37 (1993).
137. See supra note 31 (discussing the concept of "offending" property).
138. In truth, the "innocent owner" provision reveals the fallacy that is the
"guilty property" theory. If the property itself were truly the guilty party, it
would make an owner's innocence irrelevant.
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use of civil forfeitures because of its perceived lack of fairness. 13 9
One observer even suggested rewriting criminal forfeitures so as
to do away with civil forfeitures altogether. 140 This solution,
however, may be a bit extreme. Although Congress may not
have intended to preempt traditional state property rights, it
knowingly enacted civil forfeiture with the intention of increas-
ing prosecutorial power and efficacy.14 '
To best comport with the congressional intent behind
§ 881(a)(7) forfeitures, courts should reassess the relative bur-
dens borne by the government and the homeowners. Under the
current approach, once the government merely establishes prob-
able cause under § 881, the burden shifts to the claimants to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they did not use
the property in an illegal manner.142 Because of the punitive
nature of civil forfeitures, the current approach effectively
makes the homeowner "guilty until proven innocent."
Under this new approach, the government must establish
the necessary probable cause. Then, if the claimant can estab-
lish by prima facie evidence that the property is a state-pro-
tected homestead, 143 the government would bear the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence' 4 that Congress in-
tended to include such a property under its Forfeiture Statute.
The government would satisfy its burden by proving one of the
following three elements, drawn from the purposes underlying
§ 881(a)(7): the homestead substantially represents the product
of ill-gotten gain; the homestead became "indispensable in the
commission of a crime;" or the claimant did not use the home-
stead as a primary residence.
The proposed "burden-shifting" approach respects tradi-
tional state interests while honoring congressional intent to
strike *out at large scale drug traffickers. The first element
under the new approach acknowledges congressional intent to
forfeit the monetary gain of a criminal enterprise and "take the
139. See supra note 38 (citing commentators who criticize civil forfeitures).
140. Leach & Malcolm, supra note 38, at 289-90 (proposing to replace civil
forfeitures involving crimes with a criminal forfeiture provision).
141. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 20, at 192, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3374.
142. E.g., United States v. One 1986 Nissan Maxima GL, 895 F.2d 1063,
1065 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining the shift of burdens in a civil forfeiture); see
also supra notes 35-36.
143. "State-protected homesteads" would include both statutory and consti-
tutional provisions exempting homesteads form judicial sale or forfeiture.




economic incentive" out of crime.1 45 The second element satis-
fies congressional intent to reach property "indispensable" to the
criminal enterprise, 146 such as the storage barns and manufac-
turing labs. Finally, the residential requirement honors the pri-
mary purpose behind state homestead exemptions: protecting
the family.147
Most of all, shifting the burden back to the government
would bring a sense of fairmess to the process of civil forfeiture.
The "burden-shifting" approach gives claimants the due process
they deserve148 without significantly compromising the govern-
ment's ability to fight crime.149 More importantly, homeowners
like Savanah Wims will no longer have to risk losing their home
based on probable cause solely for invoking their constitutional
right to avoid self-incrimination. 150
2. Applying the Burden-Shifting Approach to Lot 5
In Lot 5, the government had clearly established probable
cause that Savanah Wims's home was subject to the Forfeiture
Statute. If Savanah Wims could have then presented evidence
that her home was a homestead under Florida law, the govern-
ment would have had the burden of proving that it was either
the product of ill-gotten gain, indispensable to the underlying
drug crimes, or that Wims did not use it as a primary residence.
Although the government may be able to successfully satisfy one
of the three elements, the "burden-shifting" approach would add
important criminal-law protection to defendants effectively in-
volved in a criminal trial.
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Lot 5, Fox Grove, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the federal civil drug-related forfeiture statute
145. See supra note 28 (discussing Congress's intent to take the economic
benefit out of the drug trade).
146. Id.
147. See supra notes 71, 78 (referring to the state's interest in protecting the
family).
148. For a discussion of the due process problems created by civil forfeitures,
see supra note 46.
149. Shifting the burden of proof to the government may actually help fight
crime. Claimants/defendants will not be able to shield legitimate criminal pros-
ecutions by claiming that they were already "punished" by the forfeiture and
invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. See supra note 39 (discussing Halper
and its progeny).
150. See supra note 37 (discussing the dilemma that claimants face if they
are also involved in a criminal proceeding).
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preempts state homestead protections. Congress amended the
forfeiture statute in 1984 to include real property that facili-
tated the drug trade. The homestead exemption provision of
Florida's constitution, however, bars judicial disposition of
homestead property. The Lot 5 court rejected the claimant's
contention that Florida's homestead exemption protected her
homestead from forfeiture, concluding instead that the federal
forfeiture statute preempted state law.
The Lot 5 court undermined recent Supreme Court deci-
sions by disregarding the clear statement rule in its preemption
analysis. Furthermore, although the court decided instead to
apply traditional preemption doctrines, it failed to do so prop-
erly. Given the traditional role of the states in regulating prop-
erty interests, and the Court's recent narrowing of preemption
doctrines, this Comment proposes that the government assume
the burden of proving that a state-exempted homestead is sub-
ject to forfeiture. This approach would ensure fairness and re-
spect state sovereignty, while leaving the government with the
tools neccessary to fight crime with forfeitures.
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